From small
beginnings early in the 20th century,
the low-tax (offshore) sector has grown
ever faster in response to high tax rates
in the developed countries, until it is
estimated now that more than half of the
world's money is in low-tax jurisdictions.
There are 70 self-declared IOFCs (International
Offshore Financial Centres)
already, and
another 100 countries that would be only
too happy to join them if the business was
there.
'Offshore' has no
precise dictionary meaning: the word
simply reflects the fact that most low-tax
jurisdictions are islands. Loosely, it is
used to mean 'outside the control of highly-taxed
nations', although those nations could have
controlled the growth of low-tax jurisdictions
much more tightly if they had wanted to.
It is an interesting question, why they
didn't maybe a combination of individual
self-interest and muddle?
In the last
decades of the 20th century, it seemed
that the large, rich nations no longer had
the financial clout or even the desire to
take on 'offshore' in any comprehensive
way. This was partly because the rich countries
had their own tax breaks and incentives
for particular local purposes, and partly
because the rich countries themselves (both
the countries and their citizens) make plentiful
use of 'offshore'. The OECD fulminated about
'harmful tax competition', and the EU complained
about 'unfair tax practices', but in the
real world of offshore there was little
change to low-tax regimes. On the contrary,
many jurisdictions which had traditionally
made their living from bananas, sugar and
tourism decided to join the low-tax bandwaggon.
In 1999 and
2000, global concerns about money-laundering
and fears about the leakage of tax revenues
gave the rich countries a motive and the
opportunity to mount a more concerted attack
on 'offshore', and this was much accentuated
by the horror of 9/11 as the world tried
to get to grips with the financing of terrorism.
The
EU, the OECD and a US Democratic administration
joined forces to attack 'offshore'.
This certainly led to better regulatory
structures in many of the IOFCs, and after
initial fierce resistance to the underlying
agenda of 'tax harmonisation', it also led
to the spread of 'transparency' among low-tax
jurisdictions, meaning that the domestic
and international (non-resident) regimes
were 'harmonized', usually at a tax rate
somewhere between the pre-existing rates.
Some jurisdictions simply abandoned corporate
taxation altogether.
Perversely,
the result of forcing the low-tax jurisdictions
to clean themselves up was to make
them into more effective competitors, and
their growth rates in the first decade of
the 21st century far outstripped those of
the high-tax countries that were tormenting
them.
One thing
that the rich countries can do, and
increasingly try to do, is to limit the
behaviour of their own citizens offshore.
As ever, their prohibitions have far more
effect on poor people than rich ones. Well-advised,
wealthy individuals and corporations generally
manage to avoid anti-avoidance measures.
The Internet
brings a new dimension to taxation,
because for the first time it is possible
for a supplier to offer and deliver some
sorts of product (e.g. music, gaming and
financial services) to citizens in ways
which completely bypass the traditional
tax-measuring and tax-collecting arms of
government. The tax leakage this implies
has spurred governments on to a more effective
attack on low-tax techniques and locations;
but they have had only partial success.
It's likely that a global approach to e-commerce
taxation will evolve in time. This is not
a problem that can be solved by individual
countries, or even by groups of countries.
IOFCs themselves
are a very mixed bag, and serve a variety
of different purposes for various types
of individual and corporation. Not all of
those purposes are legitimate: there is
no question that drug barons and other illegal
'businessmen' have used and do use IOFCs
to wash their money before recycling it
legally. The world's Governments and over-arching
economic organizations such as the OECD
have had some success in preventing abuses,
but laundering remains a problem in some
IOFCs. Among the main legal uses of IOFCs
are:
- tax-efficient
structuring of international trade
- holding
and investment companies
- offshore
investment funds
- protection
of personal wealth using trusts
- international
financial services, notably banking
and the trading of financial assets
- 'captive'
insurance companies
- shipping
registries
- betting
and gaming
- distribution
of electronic goods including music
and software
Many IOFCs
are most useful in relation to a particular
high-tax country, eg the Isle of Man
which is offshore the UK. Others have specialized
in particular business sectors. The Jurisdictions
section of the lowtax.net site describes
the characteristics and uses of many of
all the main IOFCs in depth, and in the
Uses of Offshore
later in this section you will find a sector-by-sector
analysis of how offshore can be used, with
links to the jurisdictions that specialize
in each sector.
The word
'offshore' has a certain mystique to
those who have never been part of it. Wrongly,
and helped on by the moral majority of high-tax
nations who would like to make the word
'offshore' synonymous with 'terrorism' or
'money-laundering', they often suppose that
participating in 'offshore' is not only
a bit naughty, but must necessarily be expensive.
It can be both, but doesn't have to be.
Many IOFCs use both English legal systems
and the English language; and there are
plenty of reputable advisers to help a beginner
through the early stages of using a low-tax
jurisdiction, whether in terms of trading,
investing, or in terms of living there.
It is one of the purposes of lowtax.net
to make 'offshore' more accessible and understandable,
and to provide a ready means of contacting
professionals and suppliers in low-tax areas.